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Abstract
Provider payment methods are a key health policy lever because they influence healthcare provider
behaviour and affect health system objectives, such as efficiency, equity, financial protection and
quality. Previous research focused on analysing individual provider payment methods in isolation, or
on the actions of individual purchasers. However, purchasers typically use a mix of provider payment
methods to pay healthcare providers and most health systems are fragmented with
multiple purchasers. From a health provider perspective, these different payments are experienced as
multiple funding flows which together send a complex set of signals about where they should focus
their effort. In this article, we argue that there is a need to expand the analysis of provider payment
methods to include an analysis of the interactions of multiple funding flows and the combined effect
of their incentives on the provision of healthcare services. The purpose of the article is to highlight the
importance of multiple funding flows to health facilities and present a conceptual framework to guide
their analysis. The framework hypothesizes that when healthcare providers receive multiple funding
flows, they may find certain funding flows more favourable than others based on how these funding
flows compare to each other on a range of attributes. This creates a set of incentives, and consequent-
ly, healthcare providers may alter their behaviour in three ways: resource shifting, service shifting and
cost shifting. We describe these behaviours and how they may affect health system objectives. Our
analysis underlines the need to align the incentives generated by multiple funding flows. To achieve
this, we propose three policy strategies that relate to the governance of healthcare purchasing: reduc-
ing the fragmentation of health financing arrangements to decrease the number of multiple purchaser
arrangements and funding flows; harmonizing signals from multiple funding flows; and constraining
providers from responding to undesirable incentives.
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Introduction
Health financing has three core functions, namely revenue raising,
pooling and purchasing of health services (WHO, 2010). While
health financing reforms have hitherto focused on resource gener-
ation and pooling of funds, increasing attention is now also given to
the healthcare purchasing function (Mathauer et al., 2017; WHO,
2017; Hanson et al., 2019; Sanderson et al., 2019). Purchasing
refers to the allocation of resources from a purchasing agent to a
healthcare provider in exchange for providing health services
(WHO, 2010). It involves three sets of decisions: what to purchase
(specifying benefit packages/service entitlements), whom to purchase
from (specifying healthcare facilities), and how to purchase (pro-
vider payment methods and contractual arrangements between pur-
chasers and healthcare providers) (WHO, 2010; RESYST, 2014).
Purchasing is undertaken within a healthcare market by various
purchasing actors, such as the Ministry of Health, a social or nation-
al health insurance agency, (for-profit) private health insurance
schemes, community-based health insurance funds, or non-
governmental organizations (WHO, 2010). While individuals also
pay providers directly through out-of-pocket expenditure, they do
not interact and negotiate with providers in the same way that pur-
chasing agencies can (Smith et al., 2005).
Purchasing can be passive or strategic. Purchasing is passive
when it involves merely paying bills or allocating historically based
budgets, while strategic purchasing implies active, evidence-based
engagement across the three purchasing decisions to pursue health
system objectives (WHO, 2010). Strategic purchasing plays a critical
role in achieving health system objectives of efficiency, equity, finan-
cial protection and quality, as such contributing to progress towards
universal health coverage (Mathauer et al., 2019a). It entails
strategically shaping the interwoven relationships between the pur-
chaser, the citizens, health service providers and the government
(RESYST, 2014), thereby also reducing health care market failures
of asymmetric information between individuals (patients) and
providers (Preker et al., 2007).
While provider behaviour is influenced by a wide range of
policies and organizational arrangements, a key policy instrument
for strategic purchasing is how healthcare providers are paid by
purchasers (provider payment methods). Table 1 outlines the main
provider payment methods (PPMs). PPMs are important policy
levers because they generate signals that may influence healthcare
provider behaviour in ways that may impact on the health system
objectives (Langenbrunner et al., 2005).
Previous research has tended to focus on conceptualizing and
analysing individual provider payment methods in isolation
(Kazungu et al., 2018). Research on strategic purchasing has also
tended to adopt the perspective of the purchaser to describe the
purchasing arrangements they apply in their relationships with
providers (e.g. Honda et al., 2016; Etiaba et al., 2018;
Patcharanarumol et al., 2018). However, in practice, purchasers
typically use a range of PPMs to pay healthcare providers for differ-
ent types of services. Further, low- and middle-income countries
often have fragmented health financing systems that are character-
ized by multiple purchasers; and even health systems with a single
purchaser are often characterized by the existence of multiple pay-
ment methods, such as for inpatient care, outpatient care or national
programmes for specific diseases.
As a result of this fragmentation of health financing arrange-
ments, healthcare facilities in most low- and middle-income
countries are paid based on multiple payment methods and receive
funding from multiple purchasers. This constitutes a mixed provider
payment system (Mathauer et al., 2017; Mathauer et al., 2019a).
From a healthcare provider perspective, these multiple payments
from multiple purchasers represent multiple funding flows to them.
While understanding the incentives generated by individual PPMs is
an important starting point, there is a need to expand this focus to
analyse the interactions of multiple funding flows and the combined
effect of their inherent incentives from the perspective of the health-
care provider (Mathauer and Dkhimi, 2019).
To seize the complex nature of the financial relationship between
purchasers and healthcare providers, in this paper we conceptualize
this relationship more comprehensively and capture it under the
term multiple funding flows. We define a funding flow as any trans-
fer of resources, in cash or in kind (e.g. including the deployment of
health workers, supply of medicines and medical goods) from a
purchaser to a healthcare provider for the provision of healthcare
services. In this perspective, out-of-pocket payments from an
individual to a healthcare provider are also included in the analysis
of funding flows, even though they are not an organized purchaser.
We use the term healthcare provider here to refer to the organiza-
tions that provide healthcare services (e.g. hospitals, health centres,
clinics), rather than individual healthcare workers (e.g. doctors
and nurses).
A funding flow is characterized by a distinct combination of
features. These features are:
• Services to be purchased
• Group of patients or population group to be covered
• Provider payment method to be used
• Provider payment rate used
• Accountability mechanism to be used
The various funding flows going to healthcare providers should
ideally be coherent; that is, they should generate incentives that are
complementary (rather than conflicting) and aligned to health
system goals. However, too often they are non-aligned, sending
contradictory signals to healthcare providers, with the likely effect
of distorting their behaviour (WHO, 2017).
KEY MESSAGES
• The article presents a conceptual framework that helps to assess multiple funding flows to providers.
• It is critical to understand the effects of multiple funding flows to health facilities, as the set of incentives they create
affects provider behaviour and thus ultimately health system objectives.
• Multiple funding flows need to be aligned to set coherent incentives.
• Three strategies relating to the governance of purchasing are proposed: reducing health financing fragmentation to
lower the number of multiple funding flows; harmonizing signals from multiple funding flows; and constraining
healthcare providers to respond to undesirable incentives.
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The objectives of this article are to highlight the importance of
multiple funding flows to health facilities by characterizing the
phenomenon from the healthcare provider perspective and to
develop and present a conceptual framework for analysing
how multiple funding flows create a set of incentives that influence
healthcare provider behaviour, and in turn may affect health system
objectives.
The methods section outlines how this conceptual framework
was developed. In the results section, we then present this concep-
tual framework in detail, followed by a reflection on the methodo-
logical challenges of assessing multiple funding flows. A section on
policy options for managing multiple funding flows reflects on gov-
ernance arrangements to address their consequences. A conclusion is
provided in the last section.
Methods
This section outlines how we developed the proposed conceptual
framework. It was elaborated jointly by the authors of this article,
who were involved in two related programmes of work: a study of
purchasing arrangements conducted by the RESYST consortium
(RESYST, 2014; Ibe et al., 2017; Etiaba et al., 2018;
Patcharanarumol et al., 2018; Hanson et al., 2019; Mbau et al.,
2020) and WHO’s global conceptual and country work on strategic
purchasing and mixed payment systems (Mathauer et al., 2017;
WHO, 2017; Feldhaus and Mathauer, 2018; Mathauer and
Dkhimi, 2019, WHO, 2019). Both teams identified the issue of
mixed payment systems and multiple funding flows as an under-
studied issue and conducted country case studies to describe them
and their effects (Appaix et al., 2017; Mbau et al., 2018; Phuong
et al., 2018; Mathauer et al. 2019b; Jaouadi et al., 2020;
Onwujekwe et al., 2020). The work was also informed by the teams’
knowledge and work/research experience at country level, harnessed
through brainstorming sessions. Each team had developed their
study approach, shared and presented these at technical meetings
and conferences and both teams had reviewed each other’s ap-
proach. After the country case studies were completed, and in view
of the similar findings, the teams met at a face-to-face workshop to
harmonize and refine their approaches and develop this conceptual
framework. The teams also performed a cross-case analysis, which
will be published elsewhere.
Results: the conceptual framework
The framework explains how multiple funding flows to a healthcare
provider, together with their attributes, create a set of incentives
that influence provider behaviour, thus affecting health system
objectives. The sub-sections below explain each of these aspects.
Figure 1 below outlines the framework.
Multiple funding flows and attributes
We hypothesize that when healthcare providers receive multiple
funding flows, they may find certain funding flows more favourable
than others based on how these funding flows compare to each other
on a range of attributes. These attributes are:
1. The contribution that each funding flow makes to the total
healthcare provider income
2. The adequacy or sufficiency of each of the payment rates to
cover the costs of services purchased
3. The level of managerial flexibility and financial autonomy that
healthcare providers have over each of the funding flows
4. The complexity and burden of accountability mechanisms
associated with each of the funding flows
5. The predictability in terms of timing of disbursement and
amounts of each of the funding flows
6. The performance requirements of funding flows, when these are
linked to remuneration or sanctions.
Set of incentives and their influence on provider
behaviour
We further hypothesize that when healthcare providers are faced
with multiple funding flows that vary according to one or more of
these attributes, they may alter their behaviour depending on how
favourable they find certain funding flows over others. The incen-
tives which characterise these preferred funding flow(s) will
Table 1 Main payment methods used in health systems and expected incentives
Payment method Definition Likely incentives when existing or analysing in isolation
without considering funding flow attributes
Line-item budget Providers receive a fixed amount to cover specific input
expenses (e.g. staff, medicines), with limited flexibility to
move funds across these budget lines
Under-provision, no focus on quality or outputs unless
specified and held accountable
Global budget Providers receive a fixed amount of funds for a certain
period to cover aggregate expenditures. The budget is
flexible and is not tied to line items.
Under-provision, also in terms of quality or outputs
unless specified and held accountable; more potential
for efficiency due to budget flexibility
Capitation Providers are paid a fixed amount in advance to provide a
defined set of services for each person enrolled for a fixed
period of time.
Under-provision, over-referral (if unit of payment does
not include some referral services)
Fee-for-service Providers are paid for each individual service provided. Fees
are fixed in advance for each service or group of services.
Increased provision, or over-provision
Case-based (or diagnosis
related groups)
Hospitals are paid a fixed amount per admission depending
on patient and clinical characteristics.
Increase of volume, reduction of costs per case,
avoidance of severe cases
Per diem Hospitals are paid a fixed amount per day so that an admit-
ted patient is treated in the hospital.
Extended length of stay, reduced cost per day;
cream-skimming
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dominate and influence a provider behaviour response. These behav-
ioural responses due to multiple funding flows need to be analytical-
ly distinguished from provider behaviour that is directly caused by
incentives inherent in an individual payment method, such as DRG
upcoding or cream skimming under capitation. They will also be
mediated by the firm’s objectives (e.g. profit maximization versus
certain cultural or other values that would make them favour some
payers over others), by organizational structures (e.g. the extent of
vertical integration), and by the contractual arrangements through
which individual health workers are linked to the organization (e.g.
how doctors are paid and whether they are allowed to engage in
dual practice).
In the ideal case, incentives of funding flows are complementary
and compensatory to each other and create incentives for provider
behaviour to contribute to efficient and equitable quality service
provision (Barnum et al. 1995; Langenbrunner et al. 2009).
However, the provider behaviour resulting from the incentives gen-
erated by multiple funding flows may undermine the achievement of
the health systems objectives mentioned above (Mathauer and
Dkhimi 2019). The following three provider behaviours that may be
either desired or undesired in certain contexts are likely to result
from (incoherent) incentives generated by multiple funding flows,
particularly when the funding flow(s) under question come along
with weak accountability mechanisms:
Resource shifting
This occurs when healthcare providers preferentially shift resources
in order to provide services under a particular funding flow. For
example, healthcare providers could allocate more beds, more
nurses and/or doctors or their time, and or more essential supplies to
a specific set of services, specific hospital departments or wards used
by patients who are covered by a more favourable funding flow.
Service shifting
This occurs when a healthcare provider shifts service provision
under a less favourable funding flow to a more favourable one. For
example, where publicly funded laboratory services as well as com-
mercialized, privately funded laboratory services exist within the
same healthcare facility, patients that are perceived to be able to pay
out-of-pocket could be directed from the former to the latter where
higher user charges are raised. Or, instead of treating a patient in the
outpatient department, healthcare providers may shift the patient to
its inpatient care department and thus unnecessarily admit a patient
because they consider inpatient payment methods and rates more
favourable compared to payment rates in the outpatient department.
They may also unnecessarily discharge patients early to attend to
them at the outpatient department if the converse is true. Patients
that are covered by a health insurance scheme could be asked to
additionally pay out-of-pocket because the insurer’s reimbursement
rates are considered inadequate.
Cost shifting
This occurs when healthcare providers shift costs by charging higher
rates for the same service to one funding flow, so as to compensate
for a lower payment from another funding flow or when another
payment flow goes down (relative to costs or trends). As such, one
overpays, whereas another one underpays relatively. Or healthcare
providers might charge higher rates to patients with health insurance
coverage and lower rates to cash paying users for the same service,
since cash paying users may be unable to pay the amounts charged
to health insurance schemes. In this case, the healthcare provider
would engage in price discrimination (Frakt, 2011).
Healthcare providers are likely to respond to the mixed set of
signals from multiple funding flows by engaging in multiple behav-
iours concurrently; and may even do so at quite a disaggregated
level, e.g., service by service. This means that from an analytical
perspective it may be difficult to distinguish individual responses,
and from a regulator’s perspective, it may be difficult to align
incentives with health system goals.
Potential influence of provider behaviour on health
system objectives
The behaviour incentivized by the attributes of multiple funding
flows could influence health system objectives, as outlined in
Table 2. While there are many other factors influencing the
achievement of health system objectives, such as health financing
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Figure 1 Conceptual framework of multiple funding flows. Source: Authors.
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policy design and implementation, service delivery models, health
worker skills, overall government health expenditure, etc., we focus
on the effect of provider behaviour. The table looks at the effects
of each multiple funding flow attribute on provider behaviour in
isolation, although in practice, a healthcare provider may respond to
the combination of attributes within one funding flow.
Resource shifting could influence the equity, quality and
efficiency in a health system. Resource shifting results in a
redistribution of benefits such that one patient or a patient group
benefits disproportionately from healthcare financing compared to
another patient or a patient group. This favouring of certain patients
that often belong to better-off population groups results in
Table 2 Potential influences of multiple funding flows on provider behaviour and potential negative outcomes
Attributes of multiple
funding flow
Potential provider behaviour Potential negative outcomes
One funding flow contributes a
larger share of resources
compared to another
Service shifting:
Healthcare providers could shift services from the funding flow that
contributes less to a funding flow that contributes more to the overall
resource envelope of the healthcare facilities to mobilize greater revenues.
Inefficiency because cost
shifting leads to higher costs
charged for services that
could be paid for at a lower
rate
Inefficiency if service provision
is shifted from a funding
mechanism with a lower
payment rate to a funding
flow with a higher payment
rate for the same service
Inefficiency if resources are
shifted to less cost-effective
services
Inequity if costs are shifted from
a prepayment funding mech-
anism to an out-of-pocket
mechanism
Inequity in service use between
patients that are discrimi-
nated, and those that are
favoured
Poor quality of care for patients
that are discriminated
against
Poor quality of care for services
that are underfunded due to
resource shifting
Resource shifting:
Healthcare providers could shift resources away from services paid for by funding
flows that contribute a small share of overall resources, to services that are
paid for by funding flows that contribute large shares of overall resources to
generate greater revenues.
Healthcare providers could also discriminate against patients seeking services
paid for by a funding flow that contributes to a small share of the overall
resources.
One funding flow is adequate to
cover the cost of purchased
services, while another
funding source is inadequate
Cost shifting:
Healthcare providers could shift costs to the funding flow that is adequate in cov-
ering the cost of purchased services.
Service shifting:
Healthcare providers could shift service provision to the funding flow that is ad-
equate in covering the cost of purchased services.
Resource shifting:
Healthcare providers could shift resources away from services paid for by the
funding flow that is inadequate, to services that are paid for by the funding
flow that is adequate in covering the costs of services purchased.
They could also favour patients seeking services that are paid for by a funding
flow that is highly adequate (often better-off people) in covering the cost of
services purchased.
Healthcare providers have more
flexibility over the use of one
funding flow, compared to
another
Cost shifting and service shifting:
Healthcare providers could shift costs and/or services to the funding flow that
healthcare providers have more flexibility over.
Resource shifting:
Healthcare providers could shift resources away from services paid for by funding
flows that are inflexible, to services that are paid for by funding flows that are
more flexible.
They could also discriminate against patients seeking services that are paid for by
funding flows that healthcare providers have limited flexibility over their use.




Cost shifting and service shifting:
Healthcare providers could shift costs and/or services to the funding flow that has
less complex and/or burdensome accountability requirements.
Resource shifting:
Healthcare providers could discriminate against patients seeking services that are
paid for by a funding flow that has complex/burdensome accountability
requirements.
One funding flow is more pre-
dictable in terms of amounts
and timeliness compared to
another
Cost shifting and service shifting:
Healthcare providers could shift costs and/or services to the funding flow that is
more predictable.
Resource shifting:
Healthcare providers could shift resources away from services paid for by funding
flows that are less predictable, to services that are paid for by funding flows
that are more predictable. They could also discriminate against patients seek-
ing services that are paid for by a funding flow that is less predictable.
One funding flow is linked to
performance while another is
not
Resource shifting:
Healthcare providers could shift resources away from (or to) services paid for by
funding flows that are linked to performance. They could also discriminate
against (or in favour) of patients seeking services that are paid for by a funding
flow that is linked to performance.
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discrimination of those without a favourable funding flow (also
referred to as patient cream skimming). When this disproportionate
benefit is not due to need or in line with health service priorities, it
introduces inequity in access of healthcare, i.e., it leads to discrimin-
ation among different groups of patients who go to the same health-
care provider. Resource shifting may create or aggravate under-
resourced services and thus compromise the quality of care of service
delivery. Resource shifting could also affect efficiency if resources
are moved from more to less cost-effective services.
Service shifting could influence health system goals in several
ways. For instance, when services are shifted from a prepaid funding
flow to an out-of-pocket payment mechanism (e.g. through informal
payments or balance billing), it could have equity implications.
Likewise, it affects equity if the service shifting leads to additional
and hence higher cost sharing or out-of-pocket expenditure. Service
shifting from a funding flow with a lower provider payment rate to
one with a higher payment rate for the same services has efficiency
implications, because unnecessarily greater resources are used to
achieve arguably similar outcomes. Further, quality of care could be
compromised by providing unnecessary or harmful care, when
service shifting involves over-provision.
Finally, cost shifting influences health system objectives, because
when healthcare providers charge higher rates to different purchasers
for the same service, both efficiency and equity may be compromised.
However, multiple funding flows, under the condition that they
are coherent and aligned, can also incentivise favourable provider
behaviour. For example, resource shifting can be desirable when
healthcare providers put more attention on high priority services.
This is the idea and objective of performance-based financing, in
that healthcare providers receive an additional payment and are
paid more when they reach set targets, such as higher case numbers
for pre-determined priority services (Meessen et al., 2015; Soucat
et al., 2017). When patient costs are shifted from out-of-pocket
payments to prepayment funding flows, it could promote financial
protection. Likewise, when cost shifting takes the form of charging
higher rates to a funding flow used by the well-off (e.g. voluntary
health insurance) to subsidize a funding flow used by the worse-off
(e.g. a specific health coverage scheme for the poor or patients
paying for services out-of-pocket), then equity could be improved.
Applying the conceptual framework to assess a
country’s multiple funding flows and related
methodological challenges
To assess multiple funding flows, their attributes and potential
effects on provider behaviour, we recommend a mixed methods ap-
proach by collecting both quantitative and qualitative data (Gilson
et al., 2011; Gilson, 2012). Qualitative data should entail document
reviews and conducting interviews with purchasers and healthcare
providers. Since health systems governance is crucial for strategic
purchasing to occur, information on governance related aspects can
also be collected through discussions with health system stewards,
such as the ministry of health and other ministries or oversight
board representatives. Focus group discussions could be conducted
with community members to determine patient experiences about
provider behaviour. Quantitative data on utilization rates, purchaser
claims and payment data can serve to assess the effects of multiple
funding flows on health system goals. In line with Figure 1, a step-
wise assessment is proposed: (1) mapping purchasers, healthcare
providers and funding flows; (2) analysis of funding flow attributes
and related incentives; (3) exploration of provider behaviour and
impacts on health system objectives (see also Mathauer and Dkhimi,
2019). Nonetheless, we acknowledge that it is difficult to measure
precisely the effects of attributes and the resulting incentives and to
quantify provider behaviour or impacts on health system objectives.
An entry point is to identify indications pointing to the existence of
a particular provider behaviour or indicating that there is a risk that
undesirable provider behaviour may exist; possible indications are
proposed in Mathauer and Dkhimi (2019). More methodological
work will be needed on how to rigorously assess provider behaviour,
measuring the effects of attributes of multiple funding flows and
related incentives on provider behaviour and the impact on health
system objectives. Even where there is variation in funding flow
patterns to exploit in a statistical analysis, problems of selection and
casemix differences among providers and funding flows will make it
difficult to isolate the effects of the financial incentives.
Discussion: policy options for managing multiple
funding flows
The existence of multiple funding flows is often the result of a frag-
mented health financing system and a lack of governance to address
this fragmented architecture and its consequences. Fragmentation
can have many causes and is often intensified in decentralized gov-
ernment arrangements (Mathauer et al., 2019c), which strengthens
local decision-making but may also blur the visibility of funding
flows to healthcare providers (Vilcu et al., 2019). Here, governance
is understood as ‘ensuring strategic policy frameworks exist and are
combined with effective oversight, coalition-building, regulation,
attention to system-design and accountability’ (WHO, 2007). It is
an overarching health system function, which is of particular
relevance for purchasing to be strategic (WHO, 2019). Related
governance arrangements refer to institutional, legal and regulatory
provisions through which oversight, guidance, regulation, as well as
accountability of healthcare providers and purchasers, are exerted
and through which harmonization and coordination across purchas-
ers at system level are affected (WHO, 2019).
To reduce negative effects of multiple funding flows, healthcare
providers must receive a coherent set of incentives. Coherence is
taken here to mean that funding flows are aligned in such a way that
the set of incentives results in desirable provider behaviours that
promote rather than undermine the health system objectives of
equity, quality, efficiency and financial protection. What are the
policy options that policy makers can pursue to structure their
purchasing arrangements in order to enhance the coherence of
funding flows and mitigate against the undesired outcomes of such
arrangements? Broadly, three strategies that relate to the governance
of purchasing at different levels of the health system are required.
First, as part of governance of the overall healthcare purchasing
system, health system stewards should reduce the fragmentation of
purchasing arrangements and implement reforms to consolidate risk
pools. Such reforms would lower the multiplicity of funding flows
to healthcare providers and hence reduce incoherent signals to them
(Mathauer et al., 2020). However, it is not always feasible or desir-
able to consolidate risk pools for structural and political reasons.
Further, even within single pools, multiple funding flows often exist.
As a second strategy, where multiple purchasers and attendant
multiple funding flows persist as is often the case, health system
stewards should seek to harmonize the attributes and hence the
signals sent to healthcare providers in order to reduce or avoid
incoherent incentives from different purchasers. For instance,
provider payment rates could be harmonized such that healthcare
providers do not get paid different rates for the same service by
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different purchasers and for different population groups (Mathauer
et al., 2020). Moreover, all funding flows to healthcare facilities
should be subject to harmonized accountability and reporting
requirements and decision space over their use. Likewise, each fund-
ing flow should be predictable with respect to disbursement and also
adequate and sufficient to cover the costs of services purchased.
Such harmonization will blunt provider responses by inhibiting the
generation of negative incentives.
A third strategy is to constrain healthcare providers from
responding to multiple funding flows in undesired ways. Here, ef-
fective governance arrangements targeting the healthcare provider
level are required. This includes regulation related to when and how
resource-, cost- and service-shifting is allowed, and monitoring and
enforcement to prohibit undesired behaviour. Moreover, bottom-up
accountability mechanisms such as patient and citizen feedback
should also be strengthened by ensuring that they exist and are func-
tional, and that feedback and complaints are acted upon. Some of
the funding flow attributes themselves can be considered as govern-
ance arrangements to control healthcare providers. Accountability
arrangements, for example, can be enhanced through supervision
and control by the facility oversight committee, purchaser(s) and
ultimately the ministry of health, as well as through reporting to
these actors. Performance requirements can be outlined in explicit
contracts between purchasers and healthcare providers and signal to
healthcare providers which quality and quantity aspects need
specific attention. Likewise, the degree of control granted to a
healthcare provider over financing (financial autonomy) is an
important instrument of provider level governance. Financial
autonomy determines the level of flexibility that health care
providers have over their funding flows and hence is decisive in
influencing how healthcare providers react to the set of signals.
Lastly, priority setting and resource allocation criteria at the health-
care provider level can promote more conducive resource shifting
across services, patient needs and patient groups. When these gov-
ernance arrangements are weak or absent, they make undesirable
provider behaviour more likely.
Conclusion
We have presented a conceptual framework for examining multiple
funding flows that hypothesizes that preferences for certain attrib-
utes of a funding flow determine the dominant set of incentives that
send signals to healthcare providers. These signals, in turn, influence
provider behaviour, in ways which can be both desirable and
undesired. The resulting provider behaviour then contributes to the
achievement of equity, quality, efficiency and financial protection in
healthcare service delivery positively or negatively. We have argued
for the importance of taking a healthcare provider perspective, and
for seeking to understand the set of incentives created by these mul-
tiple funding flows, rather than examining any one in isolation.
To address the challenges created by multiple funding flows,
governance arrangements are critical. This is because the three
proposed strategies for mitigating against the undesired effects of
multiple funding flows (lowering the number of multiple purchasers,
harmonizing signals from multiple funding flows, constraining
healthcare providers to respond to undesirable incentives), as well as
the political and institutional feasibility of these reforms are
contingent upon effective governance arrangements.
Additional country studies on multiple funding flows will build
the evidence and contribute to further develop the framework.
Future research could also explore effects of incentives on the
behaviour of individual health workers. Ultimately, more attention
by policy makers and practitioners to align multiple funding flows
will be an important step to better achieve health system objectives
and to progress towards universal health coverage.
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Appaix O, Kiendrébéogo J, Dkhimi F. 2017. Etude Sur le système mixte de
modalités d’achat et de paiement des services de santé: Cas du Burkina Faso,
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